UN-Blocked: The Case for Veto Reform

6/3/25

Four months after the San Francisco Conference ended, in October 1945 (United Nations) the United Nations began its operation as a mainstay of global governance. One of its key features is the United Nations Security Council, a select group of states that convene to discuss and solve global security issues. It comprises of the five permanent members of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia and China, referred to henceforth as ‘the permeant five,’ as well as ten non-permanent members, elected for ten-year terms. One of the Security Council’s major areas of criticism is the existence of a veto power, held exclusively by the permanent five members, that allows any proposal or resolution put forward to the Council to be vetoed instantly by the member state that choses to use it. This has drawn much criticism and has led to the argument that reform is needed, owing to the injustice it creates on the Security Council. This essay will evaluate arguments for its continued existence and abandonment, arguing that reforms to the veto are the best course of action to take.

 

To appreciate the arguments around the veto, its historic rationale must be understood. It is set down in Chapter V of Article 24 of the United Nations charter that members are given primary responsibility for international peace and security, and reporting to the General Assembly (United Nations, 1945). This creates an initial sense that the Security Council comes across as a level playing field between the states that are partaking on it, however, it will be established that this is ultimately not the case and is where much of where the arguments for reform arise from, to uphold this principle. The power of Veto was handed to the initial permanent members as it was believed that they had played such a critical role in international peace and security at the time, and would continue to uphold it (United Nations, 2020). This was not entirely well received, however, with Australia having dubbed it as serving “the exclusive interests of major powers… by reason of their contribution to victory in World War Two” (Bosco, 2009, pg. 36). What followed on from the implementation of this power within the permanent members was a debate as to how it would be used by each state (Goodrich, 1958, pg. 275). This lack of cohesion is the first sign of how the veto can be used solely for national interest, as opposed to its core purpose of maintaining international peace and security. This criticism becomes more prevalent as the arguments unfold. 

 

Whilst arguments for reform stand to be the most convincing, consideration must be given to the arguments surrounding its continued existence. One of the key points to note surrounding the veto in its current state is that it allows for unity within the Security Council. The existence of the veto keeps the Council moving forward as one, meaning that any decision made must be all or nothing, creating a standard of unanimity. This also means that no permanent member can be reprimanded by a resolution on the Council (Sarsar, 2004, pg. 459). This is a significant argument for the operation of the Council, as it creates a level playing field between the Permanent Five members, in which they must work collaboratively to solve security issues. The fact that the members will not be able to condemn one another in resolutions put through the Council means that the quality of resolution will likely be higher, as anything that could be seen as a political game to reprimand another permanent member on the Council would be vetoed by that member. Therefore, this argument suggests that it makes the Council effective and efficient by taking away member states’ ability to cause divisions. Another way in which the continued existence of the veto can be a substantial argument is the difficulty of changing anything to do with it. As it is part of the United Nations Charter, any significant reform to it would require approval of all five permanent members; it is incredibly unlikely that any of the major powers that sit on the Security Council would want their power of veto removed or amened, either situation would diminish their influence over international security (Bosco, 2012). Put simply, this means that one of the key arguments for the continued existence of the veto is that it would be too difficult to make substantial changes to, at least in a way that would share the balance of power beyond the permanent five members of the Council. However, as will be discussed later, there are ways in which the reforms could take place without a change to the charter, therefore not requiring such a way of changing the veto process.

 

There are major limits to the argument that the veto should simply continue to exist in its current form. The first of these is that it creates two-tier security. Part of the Security Council’s premise of existing is that all members, permanent or non-permanent, should be equal, as their common goal is global security and peace. The existence of the veto completely distorts this (Trent and Schurr, 2018, pg. 56). In its current form, the balance of power completely resides within the hands of the permanent members of the council, as they can veto proposed resolutions that do not suit them, regardless of how seemingly neutral and in the interests of peace and security it is. From an American perspective, this has been illustrated in 2024, when Russia used their veto against a resolution on Weapons of Mass Destruction in Space, which should have reaffirmed commitment against an arms race in space (United States, 2024). However, this level of influence is not available for non-permanent members of the Security Council, who may still play significant roles in global security, through organisations such as NATO. This argument against the veto’s continued existence is one that sets the case out for reforms. Another key issue with the continued existence of the reform is that the “spirit of the charter” is not being followed by permanent members (Singh, 1958, pg. 129), meaning that members have found ways of using the veto power much more liberally, outside of its intended use. One of these is the concept of the hidden veto, in which it has been used as a bargaining tactic. This is seen simply through the threat of using the veto, rather than using it (Wouters and Ruys, 2005, pg. 9). This is a problem as it stops the operations of the Council before they can even begin, which is very clearly outside of the scope of the charter. This further puts a stop to important Council work on security and peace, hindering its ability to play a role in global governance. From the arguments given above, the cons of the continued existence of the veto outweigh the pros, therefore setting out the case that either reform or abandonment is required.

 

The first major change to analyse is the idea of complete abandonment of the veto. This would entirely remove it from the permanent five members and would mean that all members of the Council would be equal in the powers they hold. One of the key draws to this solution to the issues of the veto system would be that it would make the Council a lot more efficient. One way this could be seen is through a solution to the deadlock that the council faces. When a permanent member of the council uses their veto in their own geopolitical interest, it ultimately any major progress on a resolution being passed, which, in times of crisis, becomes majorly problematic in terms of delivering a Security Council response. This has become very clear over Syria and Gaza (Webb, 2014, pg. 471), as well as the stalemate over Syria in 2013. This is entirely ineffective, as the veto, if used, can create a gridlock on the Council, leading to delayed responses to humanitarian crises, which, especially in times of conflict, completely goes against the principles of the Security Council upholding peace and security. This is an argument for abandonment as the veto can be seen to leave the Council paralysed in its ability to deal with crises, and allowing global peace and security to spiral. The total abandonment of the veto, therefore, would result in a Security Council that wouldn’t be gridlocked over permanent members’ rights to defend national interest and foreign policy objectives (Security Council Report, 2015). Abandonment would also see a step change in the way in which the balance of power lies within the Security Council by de-imperialising it. With all permanent members of the Security Council having some history of colonialism, in varying forms, it creates a divide in which they get the most substantial say on decisions made by the Council. Abandonment of the veto system would be fairer on the smaller, non-permanent members of the Council (Lopez- Claros, 2022). In the 2024 Security Council, five of the ten non-permanent members are former British and French colonies (United Nations, 2024). This is unjust for these smaller states, as former colonising states can take the lead on global security and peacekeeping. Abandoning the veto would rebalance influence over global security and decentralise power away from those seen by many as colonial powers, giving the former colonised states a louder voice. Overall, arguments for abandonment are convincing from an academic perspective, significantly more so than keeping the veto in place, however, practically, it would be extremely difficult to implement, as it would require a change to the Charter, which could be vetoed by permanent members, therefore strengthening the argument for reform as a middle ground. 

 

Whilst major reform may be difficult to implement, some can be done without amending the charter, therefore would not incur vetoes. Change to the flawed veto system can be carried out through a system of ‘non-amendment reform’ to respond to a particular challenge brought forward. It would require this challenge to be the trigger, then a proposal for the amendment to be brought forward, the charter would then be interpreted to see what could be implemented within its own framework and then the potential reforms would be consolidated (Hathaway et al, 2024). Given the various flaws of the veto system that we have already seen, the practicality of a non-amendment reform is the obvious option for how to deal with them. Whilst it might not be able to de-colonise the system in such a way that total abandonment of the veto would, reforms through non-amendment may be able to make the security council more effective at dealing with humanitarian crises by making vetoes harder to use, effectively freeing the Security Council at large to deal with pressing threats to global peace and security, without the veto being used by permanent members to heighten national interest. There is an argument that veto reform should be part of wider Security Council reform, with no immediate change but reviewing potential reforms every ten years (Soderberg, 2015). This argument is substantial as the veto does need to be part of a package of reform to the Council, however the omittance of doing anything instantly to the veto would be an unwise way of doing Security Council reform, as reviewing it every ten years would simply lead to more gridlock and more promotion of national interests over the cause of international security. Therefore, one of the key reforms that could be made instantly, without majorly affecting the permanent five would be to waive the veto in humanitarian cases. This would allow the Council to be more effective at dealing with crises and waste no time in being able to start to restore international peace and security. It would also end the possibility of permanent members from using the hidden veto in these scenarios, which is especially beneficial to those suffering from the concerned events. An example of this type of reform was seen in 2013 when the French mission to the United Nations sought to bring about a voluntary agreement to the Security Council, in which the veto would not be used in cases of mass atrocity “in order not to merely accept paralysis” (France Diplomacy, 2013). Had this been accepted by permanent members, it would have been a successful reform that would have upheld the Council’s principles. Reform is the only way to address the many issues surrounding the veto, as it can be done without charter amendment, and therefore have greater chances of being actioned, and allowing the Security Council to work properly.

 

From the arguments seen above, it is evident that the veto system is not fit for purpose. Whilst it is the simplest option, that would create the least controversy within the permanent members, continuing the veto in its current form is not a tenable position due the injustice and inefficiency it creates on the council. Total abandonment is an idea that would redistribute power greatly, creating a level playing field on the Security Council, but would be impossible to implement as the permanent five would have their power diminished as major contributors to international security. Therefore, change must be made through non-amendment reform, in a way similar to France’s proposal in 2013, in order to bring about pragmatic change on the Council that reduces levels of gridlock that the veto fuels and is more effective at dealing with the security challenges that the world faces, and the Security Council is expected to deal with.

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